Are the Kids Alright?: A Demographic Boom or a Political Landmine

A society that fails to channel the energy of its youth will be forced to confront its rebellion. Nowhere is this more relevant than in Asia today. The region is undergoing a historic demographic shift. Young people aged 15 to 29 comprise over 27% of South Asia’s population and 25% of Southeast Asia. Asia’s youth dominated demography is not just a statistical quirk - it’s a force shaping Asia’s political and economic future. This youth bulge - a surge in the proportion of young adults, is both an opportunity and a looming crisis.

Handled wisely, the youth bulge can power economies, drive technological innovation, and transform societies. Mishandled, it can fuel mass unemployment, political unrest and even violent conflicts. The challenge isn’t just managing numbers, it is managing expectations. Millions of young people are entering the workforce, seeking not just jobs but a future. Governments that fail to provide opportunities risk facing a generation that is restless, disillusioned and ready to take to the streets.

Here, we explore how different Asian Nations are navigating this demographic moment. While some have turned their youth into economic engines some are struggling with instability.

Understanding the Youth Bulge

Asia is young. In many of its countries, a staggering share of the population is between the ages of 15 to 29. This creates a demographic pattern that many demographers and the World Bank call the youth bulge. Youth bulge as a concept was rooted in the Malthusian idea of ecological imbalance which says that rapid human population growth will inevitably lead to resource strain. The term now, however, is used as a politico-demographic term based on the chronological age.
But youth itself is a fluid concept. It’s also about social roles, political identities, and economic status. In many cultures, adulthood is not determined by turning 18 or 21 but by when an individual starts a family or gains financial independence. Crucially, young populations are not monolithic. The vanguards, the most politically active youth like the student leaders, activists or influencers set the tone and shape the broader youth movement. Considering this, the age bracket of 15 to 29 reflects the core group entering adulthood which impacts economic growth, labour markets and social stability.

In many developing Asian countries youth bulge is more prevalent. Infant mortality rate, especially by the 1980s, declined because of better healthcare and nutrition. The birth rate remains high as it depends on changing people’s reproductive behaviour based on culture, society and traditional family values which take longer to change. This combination resulted in the surge of the young adult population.

The World Bank has repeatedly warned that in low-income countries the swelling of the youth population overwhelms state resources. The challenge? Whether the Asian governments can harness the demographic wave or whether it will overwhelm them triggering unrest.

Youth as a Catalyst for Unrest

History offers us a lot of warnings. When the youth bulges, so do revolutions. The French Revolution, the Taiping Rebellion, and the Arab Spring each saw a restless, youthful population pushing against stagnant population orders. More recent data also back up this pattern, when youth cohorts face economic stagnation and lack opportunities, conflict - especially internal armed conflict, becomes more likely.
Take South Asia. Groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) long capitalised on the economic despair of the youth. Jobless young men were recruited with the promise of purpose and financial security.

The link between youth bulges and violence is clear: it’s not the size of the population or the economy that matters but whether the country can provide them with enough opportunities to keep them engaged.

Economic pressure translating into unrest is also seen in different settings. Even in some high-growth economies, job creation hasn’t kept pace with the demand of the youth. Bangladesh, for instance, has averaged 6.5% GDP growth over the past decade which is impressive on paper. But around the same time period of this impressive growth, youth unemployment has hovered around 16%. Growth that doesn’t translate into job breeds frustration. As is the case with the Bangladeshi youth, when the youth is locked out of opportunity, instability follows.

Democracy, Dictatorship and Youth-led Upheaval

Economic hardships alone don’t cause instability. The political systems matter just as much. Democracies within their framework are meant to provide outlets for frustration in the form of protests, elections and activism. When these channels fail or the state machinery does not respond adequately, discontent can boil over. Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya protests in 2022 were a case in point. Young people with corruption and economic mismanagement, took to the streets, forcing President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government to collapse.

Autocracies take a different approach. They bet that by suppressing all forms of dissent they can keep the youth at check. Amidst the presence of different regime types, history shows us a pattern: full democracies which offer political expression and hard autocracies which brutally suppress dissent tend to be more stable. It’s the semi-democracies - the ones that have democratic features like elections and political pluralism but lack full democratic practices and institutions, that are the most vulnerable to youth-led uprisings.

An interesting dynamic is seen in patriarchal and exclusionary regimes, as well. In places like Afghanistan or Syria the youth found themselves with few opportunities and no political voice. Many, especially men, turned to radical groups; not necessarily out of ideology but because they offered financial security, structure and a sense of belonging. The Taliban before they took control of Afghanistan, the ISIS in its heyday and other such terror outfits have long understood this and exploited it with chilling efficiency.

If the youth are exploited by these outfits to further their cause, the youth are also the most willing to challenge the repressive norms. In November 2024, a 30-year-old Iranian woman made global headlines when she publicly removed her garments at Tehran’s Islamic Azad University, defying Iran’s strict dress code. It was a single act. But it represented something larger: the Iranian youth willing to push back despite imminent repercussions against entrenched authority.

The Urbanisation Trap: When Cities Fail their Youth

Urbanisation boosts the political risks of the youth bulge. Across Asia, young people are flocking to the cities in search of jobs and better lives. Instead, many find overcrowded housing, poor public services and meagre opportunities in an unforgiving job market. That’s led to what the social scientists call the ‘waithood’- an extended period where the youth feel stuck unable to transition to independent lives with stable jobs.

And when frustration builds, movements erupt. Thailand’s youth-led protests in 2020 and Sri Lanka’s in 2022 were fuelled in part by urban demography. Young people, educated yet unemployed or underemployed, turned to mass mobilisation in the street when traditional pathways failed them.

Many governments have kicked the can down the road to address these issues. As the clock ticks let’s look at countries that have tackled the issue.

How Some Countries turned Turmoil into Triumph

While many countries struggle with the youth-led uprisings, there are some that have turned their young demographics into engines of economic growth and political strength. Here, we will look at South Korea and China who followed two completely different models. One embraced democracy and technological innovation; the other relied on authoritarian control and industrial expansion. Both, however, found ways to channel the energy of the youth into a productive force rather than let it turn into a destabilising force.

South Korea: From struggling economy to Tech Giants

South Korea was a war-torn country in the 1960s. By 1990, it transformed into an economic powerhouse. This shift in a short period of time is often dubbed as the East Asian Miracle. A critical factor that led this transformation? A young, educated and skilled workforce. This was the result of deliberate, far-sighted policies designed to maximise human capital and not a mere stroke of demographic luck.

South Korea made massive investments in education, vocational training, and research. South Korean policies like the National Charter of Education and Industrial Workforce Development Policy created a workforce tailored for a high-tech economy. The universities expanded, STEM fields were prioritised, and technical training ensured that the graduates had the skills that the employers needed. This wasn’t education for education’s sake. Degrees translated into jobs. Job creation kept pace with population growth. The rural areas were simultaneously modernised through self-reliance by initiatives like the Saemaul Undong. Result? The GDP per capita soared from $1,100 in 1965 to over $30,000 by 2020.

Beyond the economic miracle, South Korea managed its political transition carefully. From military rule to democracy in the 1980s, the country opened up avenues to increase people’s participation. This reduced the risk of radicalisation. But this didn’t mean the end of youth activism, far from it. The 2017 impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, driven by mass protests, and recent demonstrations against President Yoon’s policies show that young Koreans remain a powerful political force. Stability, as South Korea proves, is always a work-in-progress, ongoing and never-ending.

China: Controlling the Wave, Not Riding it

The Chinese approach was different. China sought to control its youth. The One-Child Policy, enforced from 1975 to 2015, reshaped the country’s demographics. This created an “upside-down pyramid” with a shrinking youth population supporting an aging society. The unintended consequences of this policy are now evident in the form of labour shortages and an overburdened pension system. Efforts are being made to reverse the trend by lowering the legal marriage age and encouraging higher birth rates.

But there is a darker story to the Chinese demographic reality. The socialist policies like the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) under Mao Zedong led to political purges, widespread famines, and mass executions. This resulted in an estimated 40 to 50 million deaths. The youth were the primary victims of the political actions. Historians attribute the majority of the casualties to the catastrophic agricultural policies, while political crackdowns, forced labour, and persecution during various purges claimed the lives of millions more.

Unlike South Korea, which channelled the youth potential through demographic participation, China doubled down on political control. Authoritarian resilience- a term that can be used to describe Beijing’s ability to adapt without loosening its grip has allowed the Communist Party of China to maintain order while suppressing dissent. Campaigns on patriotic education and strict censorship ensured ideological conformity. It reinforced the idea that youth-driven unrest is a threat to Chinese stability.

At the same time, the Chinese economic engine has provided jobs on an unprecedented scale. Industrialisation and technological advancement have absorbed millions into the workforce.

But cracks are beginning to show. The Chinese economy has slowed down, unemployment is rising, and the conditions of work are deteriorating. Economic slowdowns can be showcased by the collapse of the Evergrande Group in the real estate crisis in 2021. Evergrande defaulted on over $300 billion in liabilities triggering a broader crisis in the already indebted real estate sector creating a ripple effect in other sectors. Many young Chinese reject the traditional demanding “996” work schedule (9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week) and instead choose a minimalist lifestyle, doing only the bare minimum to get by. Young people are willingly opting out of work by a silent protest called the “Tang Ping”, which translates to “lying flat”.

While mass uprisings since Tiananmen Square have been rare. The White Paper Protests of 2022 where the youth took to the streets against the stringent COVID-19 lockdown, is a stark reminder that even in tightly controlled societies frustrations can boil over. The Chinese experience raises questions over the long-term consequences of the heavy-handed control over demography.

The Blueprint for Stability

There is no one-size-fits-all model for managing youth bulge, but some principles do stand out. Economic diversification and job creation are essential. Countries like Pakistan with vast unemployed youth populations risk a tide of instability until they act fast. Education that aligns with market needs is crucial. South Korea’s investment in human capital and China’s focus on vocational training both demonstrate how skills development can drive economic growth.

Democratic transition when managed well can provide institutional avenues for
youth engagement, reducing the risk of radicalisation. The South Korean experience shows how gradual political liberalisation can prevent turmoil. By contrast, countries that neglect youth participation whether through economic exclusion or political repression - often find themselves grappling with unrest.
Challenges remain for Asia despite these lessons. Youth unemployment in East Asia hovers at 14.3%, while South Asia faces an alarming 54% skill hap. Investments in high-tech industries and in skill development for artificial intelligence and digital financing could bridge the gap, equipping young workers for a rapidly evolving job market. Countries like the Philippines and Indonesia with large informal labour sectors could benefit from expanding Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programs to boost workforce readiness.

At the heart of this is a simple reality; economic opportunity, education, and political participation determine whether a youth bulge becomes an asset or a liability. If the governments fail to create pathways for economic and political inclusion, frustration turns into rebellion.

Blindspots in Youth Bulge Research

The concept of the youth bulge often explains youth behaviour through broad psycho-biological patterns while overlooking the cultural and social nuances. The tendency to treat youth as a homogenous group ignores crucial distinctions in class, ethnicity, ideology and identity. There is also a tendency by the leading scholars to focus on correlation rather than causation when linking youth to conflict. The feminist scholars have rightfully pointed out that the discourse of youth and instability is too male-centric, assuming young men are the primary drivers while ignoring the role of women in conflict and activism.

There are still some major blind spots in research. How do youth bulges interact with economic inequality and political instability in middle- and low-income nations? A deeper, comparative analysis across regions could provide stronger predictive models for understanding when the youth turn into assets and when into sources of unrest.

To conclude, youth bulge is not an automatic recipe for instability. It is a challenge that requires strategic policies, and not fatalism. Asia’s future would be determined by the fate of its youth- and by the decisions made today. Governments that invest in education, job creation and political inclusion will turn their youth into engines of growth. Those that fail will find themselves confronting unrest, economic stagnation and missed opportunities.

The question really is not whether the youth bulge will shape Asia’s future- it will. The real question is whether Asia’s leaders will seize the moment or squander it.