Can Middle East Peace be Carved Out of the Gaza Rubble?

So which camp is right: the one that resolutely proclaims there is no alternative to the two-state solution or the one that is equally adamant that the two-state solution is dead? Ironically, both mantras may be right, for the first is about plausibility and the second is about feasibility.

As someone who first advocated a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip alongside Israel over fifty years ago, it still seems to me that this schema is the only plausible framework for resolving the bitter conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The idea has endured and indeed been revived recently as no one has come up with a credible alternative proposal that would satisfy the minimum core aspirations of both peoples for self-determination in a state of their own in the country that each regards as its own. These have always been the indispensable ingredients.

But is the only plausible solution still feasible? This is the heart of the matter. Tragically, Gaza has largely been reduced to rubble and its population has been decimated. But, without underestimating the obstacles, it could be rebuilt once the hostilities eventually come to an end and, within a framework of peace, its remaining inhabitants could potentially thrive. The deeper problems are in the larger West Bank where the unremitting Israeli-settlement programme over the past half century has considerably reduced the space on which the Palestinians may build their future state.

All the settlements are regarded as illegal under international law, although this has not prevented their construction in the past and, in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms, it is unlikely to prevent their further expansion in the future. Legal instruments are not enough. They need to be buttressed by robust political action. The alternative to advancing a credible political solution is indefinite conflict which, needless to say, will perpetuate the suffering and fear of the people directly affected. But not only them, as what happens in the Middle East rarely stays in the Middle East. The conflict’s toxins invariably spill over and infect societal relations in countries around the world, forcing people to take sides.

They also fuel the linked phenomena of antisemitism, Islamophobia and anti-Arab bigotry, all of which have surged in the last year or so. So it’s in almost everyone’s interest that a way is found to swiftly wind down the conflict and bring it to an end. So what might a final resolution look like and who is best placed to take the lead in transforming the political climate and forging the vital changes? Here is a sketch of the theoretical possibilities.

To begin with the two-state idea, which was originally conceived as a way of bringing the two peoples closer together on an egalitarian basis, not as a way of separating them, as certain Israeli politicians damagingly misrepresented it in later years. In any case, in the light of the many changes on the ground over the past 57 years, the shape and character of the two-state idea needs an injection of fresh thinking. An apt model today may be the 1993 division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This was a peaceful transition based not on enforced population transfers, but on mutually approved jurisdictions, with open borders and free movement. It was about political sovereignty over agreed demarcated territory, not ethnic purity.

In practice, in the Israel-Palestine case, there may be a supplementary need for equitable land swaps coupled with time-limited compensation for wilful Israeli settlers in the West Bank plus a firm deadline for the withdrawal of the army – the protector of the settlers - from the territory.

The two-state formula could also take the form of a confederation, for which there is growing support in some circles. To be credible, however, the inclusion of Jordan might need to be contemplated from the outset. Otherwise, it would mean the Palestinian state constitutionally affixing itself to a western-style, predominantly Jewish state and commensurately distancing itself from the predominantly Muslim Arab state to its east, with whom Palestinians have close cultural, linguistic, religious and familial ties. Indeed, fellow Palestinians constitute the majority of the Jordanian population. So, on further reflection, a confederation with just Israel would seem an unlikely choice for Palestinians.

With or without Jordan, it is imperative that the first step is Palestinian statehood, for a confederation is a voluntary arrangement between two or more independent states. Given the huge power imbalances, what should be scrupulously avoided is either an Israeli hegemonic state or an Israeli-Jordanian condominium over Palestine masquerading as a confederation.

A template for a future confederation could be Benelux, comprising the sovereign states of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. This might sound over-ambitious, but it is easily forgotten that wars, invasions and annexations marked the common history of these three countries in the past. Once the basic structural relationship is put right, even the strongest emotional attitudes can fade in the course of time, as witness French-German relations in recent years or, maybe more to the point, Israeli-German relations.

It is also worth recalling that during the Oslo years in the 1990s, until it all went dreadfully awry, the political culture was transformed. Hopes for an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel were aroused and co-operative Arab-Jewish projects were fostered and personal relations across the divide began to blossom. Delegations from Northern Ireland and South Africa visited Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers to pick up tips on how to do it. And research institutes noted a global decrease in antisemitic and Islamophobic incidents. It has happened once. It can happen again.

Two grass-root works in progress, jointly spearheaded by members of both societies, take into account both peoples’ affinity to the whole land. The “A Land for All” initiative proposes that all inhabitants, including Palestinian refugees and Israeli settlers, may live anywhere in the proposed confederation but may only vote in the state of which they are citizens. There would be open borders and Jerusalem would be the shared capital of both states. The “Holy Land Confederation” proposal envisages the future relationship between the two confederated sovereign states as one of “cohabitation” rather than divorce and calls for close economic cooperation.

The main impediment to these sorts of initiatives is that everywhere the political grain is moving in the opposite direction. Without a profound change of wind, the situation is likely to get worse and worse. But where might the lead come from? Certainly not from Israel or Hamas or Hizbullah. While none of these parties has the capacity to sustain their senseless conflicts for much longer, their current leaderships do not have the capability, imagination or will to end them either.

Another party which may be ruled out, other than in a supportive role, is the United States. Successive US administrations have never properly understood the region’s impulses or been honest brokers; and an even more blinkered Trump presidency is exactly what Israeli-Palestinian peace does not need right now. However, the new administration might be more at ease with the region taking charge of its own destiny. Before he leaves office, President Biden could do the world a favour by not vetoing a Security Council move to endorse Palestine as a full UN member. That would be an irreversible step and a worthy legacy.

Where all this leaves us is that right now is the right time for the region to step up and own the problem - an option that was not on the cards in the past when Israel was mostly shunned and isolated. But today Israel has full diplomatic relations with five Arab states, with others, including Saudi Arabia and potentially Qatar, hovering on the brink. The PLO and Israel have recognised each other since the signing of the Oslo Accords.

There are some indications that the region, under Saudi leadership, is alert to the need to take a strong lead. In a burst of activity, Saudi Arabia announced in September 2024 that it had formed a “global alliance” together with a number of Arab, Muslim and European partners, to push for a two-state solution, with the first two meetings due to be held in Riyadh and Brussels.

This was followed two months later by an Extraordinary Arab and Islamic Summit in Riyadh which adopted a 38-clause resolution which called for the launching of a plan, with specific steps and timing, to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent, sovereign Palestinian state based on the lines of 4 June 1967. The resolution referenced the Arab Peace Initiative, which was unanimously adopted in 2002 and which, in essence, offered Israel full diplomatic relations with all Arab states in exchange for Palestinian statehood.

If the Arab Peace Initiative, as a product, was commendable, its marketing was abysmal. No serious effort was made to alert Israeli public opinion to the content of the initiative or persuade Israelis of the sincerity of its intent. The outcome might have been quite different had it taken a leaf out of former Egyptian President Sadat’s book when, in 1977, he turned history on its head by flying at short notice into Israel where he enchanted and captivated the Israeli people.

This arch enemy, who had heretofore been portrayed as a Nazi sympathiser, appealed over the head of the country’s newly elected right-wing government direct to Israel’s Jewish population. Welcoming them back to the region after an extended and turbulent exile, he assured them of their acceptance, safety and security. But the price was the return of the entire Sinai Peninsula that Israel had captured in the 1967 war, a high price the Israeli people quickly made clear to their government they were prepared to pay. Sadat transformed the mood in Israel. I witnessed its mind-blowing impact at first-hand myself while on a research visit to the country.

Both the troubled Israelis and the fraught Palestinians need to be confident of their secure acceptance in the region if any future peace initiative is to have a chance of success. Targeted sanctions and selective boycotts, while they doubtless have a role, need to be tempered with an aliveness to these imperatives. There appears to be some – although not sufficient – recognition of this in the recent, aforementioned Arab and Islamic Summit. While its final resolution included such stock provisions as a call to suspend Israel’s participation in the UN, a ban on the export of weapons to Israel and a boycott of the products of Israeli settlements, it is noteworthy that these demands could have been harsher, as they often had been in the past. They could, for example, have called for Israel’s expulsion rather than suspension from the UN and they could have proposed a blanket ban on all trade with Israel, not just for military equipment and not just with regard to the settlements.

Also worthy of note was the inclusion of clauses that addressed major Israeli concerns, such as the appeal to UN member states to work “at all levels to disclose the fate of the kidnapped, to work to release them immediately, to ensure the provision of their protection, and to demand an independent and transparent investigation into this crime, including the arbitrary execution of some of the kidnapped”. Another clause stressed the need “to protect navigation in sea lanes in line with the rules of international law”.

Moreover, on the sidelines of the 2024 UN General Assembly, the Jordanian and Saudi foreign ministers affirmed that, provided Israel takes steps toward establishing a Palestinian state, they and other Arab and Muslim countries would guarantee Israel’s security. This is all to the good, but who would know? Such assurances need to be widely, repeatedly and effectively trumpeted in Israel, à la Sadat. It is equally important that the Saudis in particular stick to their pledge that the kingdom will not recognise Israel without a Palestinian state.

There is no time to lose. The region needs urgently to decide if it wishes merely to roll with the conflict or finally to resolve it. There are important complementary roles for other players but the prerogative now lies firmly with the region. Any initiative it promotes needs not only to satisfy the minimum core aspirations of both peoples but, crucially, allay their maximum fears. For this, it needs to be considerably more imaginative, creative and brave than it has been to date.