End Times: Exploring Political Disintegration

Dr Peter Turchin is a complexity scientist and historian specialising in cliodynamics, a field he pioneered that applies mathematical modelling to the study of historical societies. He is a Professor Emeritus at the University of Connecticut and a research associate at the School of Anthropology, University of Oxford. He also leads projects at the Complexity Science Hub Vienna and is the founding director of the Seshat: Global History Databank. His research explores long-term social processes, the rise and fall of empires, and patterns of political instability. He has authored numerous books, including War and Peace and War, Ages of Discord, and End Times: Elites, Counter-Elites and the Path of Political Disintegration.

Amogh Rai: Your book is fascinating, but I first came across your work through a smaller book that analysed 3,495 vital statistics to examine civilisations. As an economist interested in history, that approach intrigued me. Your background is in ecology, but you now apply complexity science to global history. Could you explain how Cliodynamics began and what it entails?

Peter Turchin: I’ve always been a complexity scientist, even before the field was formally established. Initially, I applied this approach to animal and plant populations, but now I study the evolution and dynamics of human societies.
Complexity science examines dynamic systems where multiple components interact in non-linear ways. Small changes can trigger cascading effects, making outcomes difficult to predict without computational and mathematical tools. We use explicit models—equations or agent-based simulations—to connect our assumptions with observable consequences and test theories with data, ideally large datasets.

My background is in population ecology, a field that integrated mathematics and data long before the social sciences. About 25 years ago, I realised these methods could fill gaps in our understanding of historical dynamics.

Amogh Rai: Your book blends large statistical models with narrative history, using examples like China’s Mandarin class and England’s War of the Roses to illustrate elite overproduction (a technical term used by Peter Turchin wherein a society is producing too many elite members relative to its ability to absorb them into the power structure leading to instability). Where does your data come from, particularly given the scarcity of written records in many societies, such as India?

Peter Turchin: This challenge isn’t unique to history. In geology or evolutionary biology, we can’t directly observe past events; we reconstruct them from incomplete data. The same applies to historical societies, though systematic methods had not been widely used in history until recently. By studying large-scale states that emerged around 6,000 years ago, we see they typically function well for about a century before experiencing crises…

Crises inevitably emerge, often leading to civil wars, revolutions, or upheavals. One key driver is population immiseration—the widespread impoverishment of society. When large sections of the population suffer economic hardship, dissatisfaction rises, increasing the risk of violence.

To analyse this, we examine economic data—wages, income, and wealth—but also social and psychological well-being, measured through happiness and dissatisfaction surveys. For historical analysis, biological well-being serves as a proxy. Average population height, influenced by childhood nutrition, physical hardship, and disease exposure, provides valuable insights. Since genetic composition remains stable, height trends reflect broader societal conditions. Human skeletons, preserved across centuries, offer a rich dataset; in Western Europe alone, over two million skeletal remains help track immiseration trends. This is one way historical proxies allow us to understand past societal shifts.

Amogh Rai:
Your book discusses cycles of violence linked to immiseration—turmoil, an opening-up period, then stabilisation. In End Times (2023), you reference Angus Deaton’s work on Deaths of Despair in the U.S. Do you see this cycle as a global phenomenon or a regional one?

Peter Turchin: We primarily study internal dynamics within large states like the U.S., China, and Russia. While external factors matter, larger states tend to be more insulated, making internal cycles clearer. Over a thousand years, we see rough synchronicity in crises across major states, though not perfect alignment.
History shows four major disintegration periods: the Age of Revolutions (1789–early 20th century), peaking in the 1848 European revolutions, China’s Taiping Rebellion, and the U.S. Civil War; the General Crisis of the 17th Century, affecting Eurasia and the Americas; the Crisis of the Late Middle Ages (1350–1450); and the Crisis of the 12th Century. These cycles are primarily internally driven but can align due to global conditions—like metronomes on a shared surface gradually synchronising.

Amogh Rai: That makes sense. One striking part of your book is how you connect two seemingly different historical figures—Abraham Lincoln and Donald Trump.
Your framework of elites and counter-elites makes sense, but when you extend it historically—linking Trump and Lincoln through common patterns—an important question emerges: Can elites today escape these cycles?

In Russia, for example, we’ve seen a massive exodus of millionaires and billionaires. If elites leave, does that mitigate chaos or merely shift instability elsewhere?

Peter Turchin: That’s a great question, but first, let’s outline the forces driving instability.

When a society remains stable for several generations, elites accumulate power. Without constraints, they begin to reshape the economy in their favour, increasing wealth inequality. This process—what I call the wealth pump—transfers resources from the lower classes to the elite, leading to: Widespread immiseration – Economic decline for the majority. Elite overproduction – More people aspiring to elite status. Intensified internal conflict – Growing competition among elites.

Modern societies recruit elites based on wealth and education. As elite numbers swell but opportunities remain limited, factionalism and instability grow.

Now, does elite migration reduce instability? It depends. On one hand, their departure can ease internal competition. On the other, it can weaken institutions, cause brain drain, and export instability elsewhere. The outcome depends on how remaining elites manage the situation.

A key problem is elite overproduction —more degree holders competing for a fixed number of elite positions, especially in politics. It’s like musical chairs: if the number of players triples but the chairs stay the same, conflict is inevitable.
Now, let’s return to your question. Would you mind repeating it?

Amogh Rai: Sure. Unlike in revolutionary France or medieval England, elites today have more mobility. Russian billionaires relocate to Dubai, avoiding complete collapse at home but also failing to stabilise it. Does this challenge Engels’ thesis?

Peter Turchin: Not at all. Elite migration has always been part of the process.
Take the English Revolution. After Charles I’s defeat, many Cavaliers fled to the American colonies, reducing tensions at home. Similarly, in 1990s Russia, oligarchs controlled the state, but when Putin consolidated power, many were forced out. Once abroad, their influence over Russian politics diminished.

Elite flight can temporarily ease pressure, but it doesn’t eliminate instability—it simply shifts its dynamics.

This may have other negative consequences, but in terms of state stability, elite migration can be beneficial.

For example, during the Ukraine war, many degree holders left Russia, reducing elite competition. While this may harm economic growth, it stabilises the state—those who remain earn higher salaries and feel more secure, lowering the likelihood of rebellion. I’m not saying this is an overall good outcome, but strictly from a stability perspective, it reinforces order.

Amogh Rai: That’s interesting. In your book, you discuss how English elites once exported their dissatisfaction by extracting rents in France, which contributed to instability there. Today, Russian elites relocating to the West don’t seem to destabilise their host countries but still influence their homeland. Meanwhile, those who stay must maintain loyalty to the regime or face dire consequences. Does this mean modern instability is more manageable than in the past?

Peter Turchin: Not necessarily. The fundamental dynamics remain.
Take the Crisis of the Late Middle Ages—France collapsed due to elite overproduction and internal conflict, allowing England to invade. English nobles seeking status relocated to France, easing tensions at home. But when France recovered and expelled them, these displaced elites returned to England, fuelling internal strife that led to the Wars of the Roses.

Today, elites may be more mobile, but the pressures of competition and overproduction still exist. When billionaires flee to places like London or Cyprus, they lose direct influence over their home country, easing internal pressure without necessarily destabilising their new location. They often become political retirees rather than agitators.

Contrast this with Russia in the 1990s, when an influx of Western economic advisors and fund managers created pressure on the government. The key difference is whether elites are leaving or entering a country—one process reduces instability, while the other can exacerbate it.

Amogh Rai: That’s a fascinating insight. Now, shifting to another theme in your book—your views on lawyers stood out. You don’t single out other professions in the same way. Why do you consider them particularly problematic?

Peter Turchin: Another historically disruptive profession is teaching—many revolutionary leaders, like Hong Xiuquan of the Taiping Rebellion, were teachers.
As for lawyers, many major revolutionaries—Lenin, Castro, Robespierre, Gandhi, and Lincoln—were trained in law. Even today, many dissident elites in the U.S. come from law backgrounds. Yale Law School, for example, has produced figures like Stewart Rhodes, founder of the Oath Keepers. This isn’t to say lawyers are inherently dangerous, but historically, they have played key roles in revolutionary movements.

Amogh Rai: That’s interesting, especially in the context of AI and automation.

Peter Turchin: The issue isn’t lawyers themselves but their oversupply. In the U.S., the legal profession was balanced in the mid-20th century, but today, three times as many law graduates enter the field as there are jobs. With AI likely to automate legal tasks, this could worsen—potentially leaving six times more graduates than available positions.

The real risk isn’t just unemployment but frustrated elites—intelligent, highly trained individuals with few opportunities. Historically, such conditions have fuelled revolutionary movements.

Amogh Rai: That ties into your broader concern about job creation. Given the fragile economic landscape, what long-term policies should states adopt to address these risks?

Peter Turchin: States have historically managed elite overproduction by creating new positions—military officers, bureaucrats, or ideological roles like clergy. However, this often leads to another crisis: fiscal collapse. As the general population becomes impoverished, tax revenues decline, putting further strain on state resources, especially when trying to accommodate surplus elites.

Financial collapse has often triggered instability—both before the English Civil War and the French Revolution, state expenditures became unsustainable. Simply creating more elite positions isn’t a long-term solution; it eases short-term pressures but doesn’t address the root causes. Historically, societies escape these cycles only after a period of civil war or revolution, which forces mass downward mobility among elites—some are killed, exiled, or pushed down the hierarchy.

The key to stability is shutting down the wealth pump—the system that funnels resources from the lower classes to the elite. Without this, elite overproduction continues, ensuring future crises. The Russian Revolution provides an example: mass elite displacement was brutal, but it temporarily resolved elite overproduction and restructured the economy in ways that improved worker wages.

Amogh Rai: That makes sense for the Western context. But looking at China’s historical collapses, was elite overproduction the main cause, or did external factors—like famine—play an equal role? Your book Figuring Out the Past suggests that empire collapses often follow long cycles of displacement.

Peter Turchin: Elite overproduction is the most consistent driver of crisis, though factors like environmental stressors can exacerbate instability. China exemplifies this—natural calamities often coincided with periods of elite competition, amplifying societal breakdowns.

Amogh Rai: Agreed. But consider Japan—between 1990 and 2012, its economy stagnated, yet the state remained stable. Does this challenge your framework?

Peter Turchin: Not necessarily. Japan already experienced a long period of instability—from the Meiji Restoration (1868) to the end of World War II (1945). Before modernisation, Japan faced a structural demographic crisis—its population surged, and the samurai class expanded even faster, leading to widespread impoverishment among them.

Post-1945, Japan underwent dramatic restructuring under U.S. occupation. General MacArthur oversaw elite displacement, economic reforms, and power redistribution. This downward mobility helped reset elite competition, allowing Japan to avoid the crises seen in other stagnating economies.

Japan has not yet reached full-blown crisis, but underlying pressures are building. A colleague researching Japan’s social and economic trends has found stagnating birth weights—an indicator of societal stress—and widespread corruption.
Japan’s political system functions more like a clan structure, with more than half of its prime ministers in the past 70 years descending from a single 19th-century samurai lineage. This monopolisation of power fuels elite frustration, increasing the risk of counter-elites.

A key next step would be a global analysis, selecting ten countries to track elite overproduction and instability, similar to what I did for the U.S. in 2010. By publishing predictions and evaluating them over a decade, we can rigorously test the theory’s validity.

Amogh Rai: That makes sense. In End Times, you outline strategies to counter instability. Since publishing, have you added anything new to this toolbox?

Peter Turchin: Not significantly. The structural problems driving instability—particularly in the U.S.—have worsened over the past year. One unexpected development has been inflation. While overall inflation rates have declined, food and energy costs—critical for lower-income groups—have surged.

Economists ask, why is everyone unhappy when inflation is falling? But essentials like rent, fuel, and food have become significantly more expensive. Meanwhile, elite overproduction remains unchecked, exacerbating societal instability. These trends continue moving in an unfavourable direction.

Amogh Rai: Professor, my final question is in two parts. First, how have neoliberal economic policies—especially second- and third-generation reforms—contributed to elite overproduction? In Asia, we’ve seen risky, VC-funded startups thrive under low interest rates, often elevating founders into the top income brackets regardless of their success. Has this economic recklessness—low taxation, artificial interest rates, and trickle-down economics—widened inequality and fuelled counter-elites?

Peter Turchin: Absolutely. As societies stabilise, ruling elites reshape economies to their advantage—often using ideology to justify it. In the U.S., neoliberalism provided this cover.

Initially a fringe economic school, neoliberal ideas gained traction in the 1970s—not because they were necessarily sound, but because they served elite interests. These policies—low taxation, deregulation, and weak industrial policy—spread to Europe and beyond, worsening inequality and instability.

Amogh Rai: That brings me to my second question. Around the world, figures like Trump and Milei have risen on populist waves but failed to meaningfully steer their states. Is this because modern bureaucratic elites are too entrenched, limiting their ability to enact change? And what does this mean for the future of the state?

Peter Turchin: The problem is that leaders like Trump and Milei don’t understand the root causes of instability. Milei, in particular, takes neoliberalism to an extreme, believing unfettered markets will self-correct—when, in reality, his policies deepen immiseration.

Trump, despite his lack of coherence, instinctively recognised the need for industrial policy, which economists increasingly acknowledge as necessary. However, his execution was poor, and other policies—such as tax cuts for the wealthy—exacerbated inequality.

The key issue is a failure to grasp these deeper structural problems. End Times was written precisely to highlight them—so that we focus on real solutions instead of policies that create unintended consequences.

Amogh Rai: I’m a big fan of your work, especially Ages of Discord. I’d love to invite you back to discuss it when you have more time.

Thank you, Professor Turchin, for this insightful conversation.