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The creation of an intellectual property system in China is among the most notable developments in the world economy in recent decades. Intellectual property was nonexistent in the People’s Republic until the late 1970s. The idea of private rights in innovations or creative works was alien to a socialist system where information was a shared property. It was incompatible with the Maoist belief that invention belonged to the masses and not to any one person.

Everything began to change in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping introduced a strategy known as the “Reform and Opening-Up” that opened the door for international investment. Foreign businesses, especially those with advanced technology, have made it clear that they will not invest in China unless the law protects them. Collaboration was conditioned on technological safety. Under pressure from abroad, Beijing started creating a legal framework to protect intellectual property, not so much to protect Chinese innovators as to reassure its international partners that China would no longer be a free-for-all for copying.

With the enforcement of Trademark Law of 1982 and the Patent Law of 1984, the first parts came together. The safeguards were limited by international norms. Entire industries, including chemicals, food, and pharmaceuticals, were not covered by patents. Instead of encouraging a culture of innovation at home, the laws served as a means of indicating a readiness to abide by international regulations. This early framework was completed by the Copyright Law of 1990, which once again reflected international standards above regional ones.

In pursuit of membership to the WTO in the late 1990s and early 2000s, China took a number of steps, the most prominent of which were the acceptance of the TRIPS Agreement. This, in return, forced China to impose stricter regulations. In 1992, China added the patent of drugs and chemicals and in 1993, copyright on software. By the time of its accession in 2001, China’s patent system within the decade had undergone radical reform as a result of its membership. However, the motivation to do so was externally driven and served to meet obligations as set forth on China.

The most crucial next step was Enforcement. There were many complaints from the government and foreign companies regarding the increasing counterfeiting and piracy. In return, China took steps to show that they were serious. In 2008, they added the compulsory licensing and protection of designs to the Patent Law. In 2010, the Copyright Law was revised so that technology piracy became a crime. The 2013 Trademark Law was a legislative solution to the problem of “trademark squatting,” and in 2014, the setting up of special IP courts in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou reflected steps towards more professional decision-making.

By the mid-2010s, the focus had shifted from merely satisfying foreign interests to becoming a cornerstone of industrial policy. Initiatives like Made in China 2025 and the following Five-Year Plans transformed intellectual property into a key driver of technological advancement. The updates made to the 2020 Patent Law, which introduced higher statutory damages, a patent linkage system for pharmaceuticals, and improved design protection, were clear indicators of this shift. Copyright laws were also updated to keep pace with the digital era, particularly concerning streaming and webcasting. This evolution unfolded against the backdrop of the U.S.-China trade war, highlighting how external pressures and domestic ambitions influenced each other.

China continues to view patents differently from most countries in the world. Patents are more of an instrument of policy than an area of law, which is static in nature. In the 80s, it was an instrument of investment attraction. In the era of the WTO, it was a question of compliance. Now it is about upgrading the industry and asserting technological dominance.

China’s achievement in 2022 is particularly striking. Chinese patent filers applied for 1.59 million patents, more than any individual country. This is twice the number of filings from Japan, South Korea, and the United States combined in a single year. Since the year, 2018, China’s patent office has been the busiest in the world. However, numbers tell only a part of a richer history. Critics talk of patent bubbles, which purely depend on incentives and a focus on accumulating intellectual property for subsidies, or a desire to meet innovation targets, which emphasise the patenting process rather than the quality. Recent changes are a signal that Beijing understands quality matters. China is focused on increasing the high-value patents owned, improving the system of damages awarded, and enhancing the licensing practices of the country. This system partially serves the needs of the Private rights and the broader goals of the state. In China, IP is seen as a pillar of the country’s system of innovation, industrial expansion and global dominance.

Tariffs, Technology, and the Geopolitics of Innovation

The emergence of intellectual property as the legal framework of China’s rise, alongside the functional prowess of tariffs as both enablers and impediments to the country’s technology growth, is quite telling. Tools of crude protectionism and revenue sources are now regarded as sophisticated instruments of technological statecraft in the twenty-first century. The sharpest expression of this new function of tariffs is the trade warfare between China and the US.

It was during the Trump administration that the US-China trade war ‘officially’ began in 2018. The attempt to reduce America’s bilateral trade deficit with China rapidly metamorphosed into a skirmish over technology and intellectual property. The Office of the United States Trade Representative in March 2018 published the Section 301 Report, outlining accusations against China regarding technology transfers, discriminatory licensing practices, and the inadequate protection of foreign intellectual property. Advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, and robotics were some of the sectors that Washington’s tariffs covered, which were imposed on Chinese goods worth hundreds of billions of dollars. In retaliation, Beijing imposed tariffs on critical minerals that global targets employed to manufacture military weapons, automobiles, and semiconductors.

This was not a normal tariff dispute. From the beginning, it was also about technology policy. With the purpose of slowing China’s ascent up the global value chain, Washington sought to slow the import of Chinese electronics, machinery, and components. Beijing also countered the tariffs with state subsidies and invested in 5G, electric vehicles, and robotics. Along with the trade balance, tariffs also became tools to determine the direction of technological competition. Trade balance and investment became increasingly interchangeable.

The industry of semiconductors became the most important battleground. China, the biggest consumer of chips, has a unique vulnerability as a result of U.S. pressure. Advanced semiconductors, on which China heavily depends, are imported. U.S. tariffs and export controls on high chips and manufacturing put heavy pressure on Huawei, SMIC, and China as a whole. These actions also raised difficult questions under international trade law. WTO members are mostly protected by the bound rates and tariffs, which are justified by Trade II exceptions under the GATT. The unique exception is Article 21, which allows restrictions for “essential security interests” protection. The United States has invoked this clause to defend its tariffs and export controls, a move that underscores the convergence of trade and national security policy. Although WTO panels have historically avoided challenging states on security grounds, recent disputes have tested the limits of Article XXI.

China challenged the U.S. tariffs at the WTO, and in September 2020, a panel ruled that the Section 301 measures violated WTO rules. It rejected Washington’s argument that the tariffs were justified responses to unfair trade practices. The panel found that the United States had not shown that its actions could be defended under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994, and therefore concluded the tariffs breached Articles I:1, II:1(a), and II:1(b). In essence, the WTO determined that the U.S. measures against China were both discriminatory and excessive, and that no valid legal exemption had been demonstrated.

Beyond litigation, tariffs have been folded into the industrial strategies of both countries. In the United States, they are linked to reshoring and supply-chain security, reflected in the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, which provides subsidies for domestic semiconductor manufacturing. In China, these tariff dynamics dovetail with industrial strategies such as Made in China 2025, a state blueprint aimed at localising production and reducing dependence on foreign technologies. The link between tariffs and intellectual property becomes clear in this context. Duties on advanced technologies often push foreign firms to localise production inside China, typically through joint ventures or licensing arrangements that involve the transfer of intellectual property. Yet the same tariffs can also discourage entry, narrowing cross-border flows of technology.

The power dynamics between licensors and licensees are always changing due to this tension. A robotics company in the US whose exports to China incur a 25 per cent tariff, for example, might find it easier and more profitable to license the patents to a company in China or set up a subsidiary there. Tariffs, in this instance, not only change the route of trade but also change the structure of the trade’s intellectual property agreements. They are also indirect trade policy instruments, changing the business and legal practices of a country well beyond the trade borders.

From Beijing’s perspective, the sustained focus on tariffs mandated the self-strengthening of the country’s technology capabilities. State policy has, therefore, given priority to the domestic robotics, automation and semiconductor industries that have been heavily reliant on foreign technology. Evidence emerging from relations with the US suggests that export tariffs on highly advanced humanoid and service robots have created a dual effect. Consumer prices have climbed significantly in the US due to the trade tariffs, and the US export policy has also softened. There is a clear irony in this scenario. Policies that are ostensibly created to contain China’s technological progress have, in fact, stacked the odds on China’s self-sufficiency.

From simple economic levers, tariffs have evolved into instruments of legal and geopolitical engineering, shaping markets, intellectual property flows, and industrial policy at once. What emerges is a blurred terrain where trade law, security strategy, and innovation policy converge, placing intellectual property at the centre of geopolitical contestation.

Tariffs and Robots: Industrial Policy in Action

One of the industries that better exemplifies the implications of the intertwining of tariffs and trade with technology is the robotics industry. Over the last two decades, China has not only become the largest world market for industrial robots but also a significant producer. This dual of consumer and producer roles makes the robotics technology a particularly rich one for understanding how trade and law argue in the world’s technological competition.

According to the International Federation of Robotics, in the year 2023, China installed a record high of 276,288 industrial robots, which constitutes 51% of the world’s industrial robot installations. China’s stock of operating robots has surpassed that of Japan and the United States as a result of the overwhelming demographic changes, increasing labour costs, and diligent government action. Targeted policies such as the “Made in China 2025” and the “14th Five-Year Plan” consider robotics as a key export industry in China’s drive towards higher automation and productivity.

Despite these achievements, foreign companies remain dominant in high-end robotics markets. Firms such as FANUC of Japan, ABB of Switzerland, and Germany’s KUKA retain strong positions in the production of precision components, robotic arms, and advanced control systems. Chinese companies, including Estun Automation, Siasun, and EFORT Intelligent Equipment, are gradually expanding their capabilities, but the sector remains heavily reliant on foreign suppliers for critical technologies. This dependence has made robotics a particularly sensitive area in the context of U.S.-China trade frictions.

During the trade war, the United States imposed tariffs of up to 25 per cent on a wide range of Chinese machinery and robotics-related imports (818 products). These measures targeted industrial robots, motors, controllers, and precision components under the Harmonised System classification. China retaliated with tariffs on U.S. robotics equipment and components, but its reliance on imported technologies limited the effectiveness of these countermeasures. The result was a disruption of supply chains that raised costs for U.S. manufacturers and, at the same time, incentivised Chinese firms to accelerate domestic substitution.

The effect of such tariffs extended past just raising prices within a specific timeframe. For U.S. manufacturers, such as in automotive and electronics, the duties effectively increased the price of Chinese robots, thus lowering competitiveness in labour-intensive industries. At the same time, these endured in China, as it emphasised the need to develop local capability. State procurement, subsidies, and legal restructuring are intended to spur local innovation, thus lowering reliance on imports. Reports in 2024 and 2025 indicate that tariffs and export control policies significantly delayed the entry of advanced humanoid and service robots to the United States, resulting in even higher prices because of inflated tariffs.

The effects of tariffs on intellectual property documents are diverse and often neglected. Foreign companies employ different strategies when the cost of exporting robotic arms increases because of tariffs. They often start by licensing complex IP like patents, trade secrets, and software to a Chinese company that will engage in local production. Another strategy involves the formation of joint ventures with Chinese partners and thus relocation of the production, in order to evade the duties. Others focus more on less tariff-sensitive industries like software, services, and after-sales support. They all require complex legal frameworks. While joint ventures present concerns about ownership, contributions, and intellectual property rights, licensing entails compliance with Chinese contract law and technology transfer regulations.

Foreign businesses seeking steady returns in China now find licensing deals more appealing as a result of the 2020 amendments. Tariffs, on the other hand, have served as an indirect means of technology transfer, encouraging international businesses to transfer intellectual property locally rather than sending goods overseas.

Although this outcome is in line with Beijing’s long-standing emphasis on indigenous innovation, its compelled dissemination of cutting-edge technology has alarmed Washington and Brussels.

From the perspective of legal reasoning, robotics tariffs can be explained as regulatory tools with extraterritorial implications. They redefine not only market prices but also the conditions of intellectual property trade. This is a question of significant legal importance. First, are tariffs compatible with WTO law? Disputes such as United States Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China (DS543) suggest that unilateral tariffs often exceed WTO commitments. Second, can robotics be classified as a dual-use technology relevant to national security, thereby justifying exceptions under GATT Article XXI? Both the United States and China have, at times, invoked security rationales in the robotics sector, but the scope of the exception remains contested. Third, do tariffs blur the line between voluntary and coerced technology transfer, potentially contravening the spirit of TRIPS Article 27, which prohibits discrimination by field of technology?

The strategic consequences of these dynamics are profound. For the United States, tariffs have slowed the inflow of low-cost Chinese robotics equipment but increased costs for domestic manufacturers, potentially undermining competitiveness. For China, tariffs have accelerated its long-term goal of achieving self-sufficiency in robotics and automation, reinforcing its industrial policies. As robotics evolves toward AI-driven humanoids and service applications, the interplay between tariffs and intellectual property will only intensify. Standards-essential patents for robotics interfaces, copyright in machine learning models, and software licensing will likely become new battlegrounds in the techno-legal rivalry.

Law, International Law and the National People’s Congress

China’s rise as a technological power has unfolded within, and often against, the framework of international economic law. Intellectual property has been central to this process, both as a mechanism of compliance and as a site of contestation. When China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001, it accepted the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement, which required sweeping reforms across patents, trademarks, and copyright. These included expanding the scope of patentable subject matter, strengthening enforcement mechanisms, and revising copyright law to align with Berne Convention standards. Although China formally complied, foreign governments and firms frequently criticised the gap between legislation and enforcement. Weak criminal thresholds, selective prosecutions, and policies encouraging technology transfer kept China on the U.S. Trade Representative’s “Priority Watch List” for intellectual property violations from the late 1990s onward.

This tension between legal compliance and enforcement flexibility surfaced in multiple WTO disputes. In China- Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (DS362), the United States challenged China’s high thresholds for criminal liability and its handling of counterfeit goods. In 2009, the WTO ruled that several of China’s practices were inconsistent with TRIPS. That same year, in China-Publications and Audiovisual Products (DS363), a panel upheld U.S. claims that Chinese restrictions on foreign cultural products violated both TRIPS and China’s market access commitments. These cases revealed the dual character of China’s approach: compliance on paper but significant discretion in practice.

Technology transfer has long been one of the most contested aspects of the global intellectual property regime. TRIPS explicitly identifies technology transfer as a legitimate policy objective under Article 7. Yet Western governments have argued that China’s joint venture requirements and localisation rules amount to coercion, undermining the principle of voluntary licensing. The U.S.-China trade war magnified this tension. In 2020, a WTO panel decided in United States Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China (DS543) that the U.S. tariffs imposed under Section 301 breached fundamental WTO commitments on tariff bindings and most-favoured-nation treatment. However, Washington justified its actions as a reaction to what it called China’s unfair intellectual property tactics, transforming intellectual property disputes into a justification for unilateral trade reprisal. The dispute revealed a deeper divide: intellectual property was no longer just a matter of enforcement or licensing. The legitimacy of the international trading system was now intrinsically linked to it.

Since that time, Washington and Beijing have increasingly relied upon national security as a legal justification for extraordinary measures in sensitive technologies. The United States has invoked GATT Article XXI to justify its tariffs and export control regime over semiconductors, 5G, and robots, and China has accordingly strengthened export controls over rare earths and graphite, alleging essential security. The broader interpretation of exemptions under the WTO obligations adds more uncertainty to the legal predictability of WTO law. Drawing from ‘national security’ as a façade for economic competition, both wings of the executive branch disdain the already weak TRIPS system and the innovation–public interest protection balance.

China tends to rely on the notion of ‘sovereignty’ quite a bit in its interpretations. In NPC meetings and in the ‘official’ discourse, there tends to be a lot of emphasis on ‘law’ in the ‘needs’ of ‘development’ in a ‘law’ of its own. ‘Policies’ such as ‘Made in China 2025’ and ‘High Tech Industry Support’ provide the rationale for the use of TRIPS flexibilities, especially Article 8, which deals with the protection of the public interest in certain essential areas. Such a strategy has been dubbed ‘selective adaptation’, where formal compliance with global obligations is ‘nationally’ configured.

The NPC plays a key role in the embodiment of the aforementioned constituents into legislation. Intellectual property reform has always had, in addition to international and external factors, factors within China itself. The NPC debate is an illustration of this, much-documented balance of ‘in’ and ‘out’. Consider, for example, the emphasis given to two issues advanced by the 2020 Patent Law amendments by some members of the Standing Committee. It was believed that IP rights, if enforced and controlled as needed, would stimulate local Research and Development and innovation, but would provide an undue advantage to foreign companies competing in China. This delicate balance was also reflected in the implementing legislation, which was strong enough to relieve pressure from other countries, but also flexible enough to maintain policy space for China’s own industrial champions.

Intellectual property in China is different from the rest of the world because of its aspirations for technology development. While the rest of the world’s intellectual property frameworks developed through case law and market activities, China’s is designed to reshape a country’s industry. Changes focus with the economic reforms delineated in the Five-Year Plans, the ‘Made in China 2025’ policy, and the more recent policies aiming for technological autonomy. With the focus on the 13th Five-Year Plan in terms of ‘development through innovation’ and the 14th Five-Year Plan reiterated, the country has marked industrial and intellectual property as a ‘National Strategic Resource’ in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technology, and biotechnology.

Chinese legal thinking has been formulated and influenced by the integration of law with industrial policy. Intellectual property as state-driven development is more than an abstract contraction of individual rights. In the 2020 revision of the Patent Law, for instance, the document, in addition to the form compliance, underwent ‘reduction to practice’ by having priority for autonomy-driven pharmaceuticals and microchips.

The world has entered a new age with the development of artificial intelligence. While many nations have been hesitant to provide intellectual property rights for AI-generated works, Chinese institutions have adopted a different stance. The Beijing Internet Court granted copyright in 2023 for a work in which automation played a significant role, as long as a threshold of human creativity could be determined. Despite the lack of doctrinal discussion, this shows a flexible and pragmatic strategy that emphasises the quick adoption of technology. The legal reasoning that suggests otherwise revolves around the intense focus of both the US and China on semiconductors, which has become a key strategic element. On a global scale, China has been pushing for “fair access” to technology mapping from abroad, while simultaneously opposing the American restrictions on advanced chipmaking technology. Within its own borders, China has sped up the patent application process for semiconductor design and manufacturing, thanks to state support. The 2020 amendment to the Patent Law was seen as a way to create certain patent linkages in pharmaceuticals, but it also aimed to boost domestic innovation in the semiconductor sector.

Among the most transparent cases is in standard-essential patents (SEPs) disputes, particularly in telecommunications. In Huawei v. InterDigital (2013), although the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court not only decided on royalty rates in line with the fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) standard but also banned InterDigital from pursuing injunctions overseas, the rationale was concerning avoiding “abuse of dominance” and ensuring Chinese firms were able to access foreign technology on an equal basis. Such a ruling was a manifestation of a double logic: compliance with international antitrust norms on the one hand and safeguarding local companies in global markets on the other.

China’s innovation and intellectual property history over the past forty years has been one of remarkable transformation and defies simple categorisation. China, which in the late 1970s lacked a modern intellectual property system, has since developed one that rivals and even outperforms established nations in certain areas. There have been periods of reactive legislation in response to international pressure, accommodating reforms to meet the requirements of a new generation of WTO membership, and since then, a few instances of deliberate recalibration aimed at using intellectual property to further industrial policy and geopolitical standing. The journey has not been a straight line.

Finally, Western assumptions regarding intellectual property as an impartial framework of private rights are called into doubt by the Chinese approach. Beijing’s legal system is tightly linked to its strategy, which serves as a weapon for geopolitical talks, an aid to industrial policy, and a system of internal governance. The question that needs to be asked by scholars, businesses, and politicians is not whether China will “catch up” to international standards, but rather how it will modify them to fit its own goals. Beijing’s creation of an intellectual property system based on pragmatism, industrial drive, and governmental control shows that future innovation regulations will be made in Beijing just as much as in Geneva, Washington, or Brussels.

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