Powering the Chinese Navy with Hybrid Naval Vessels

The deep integration of dual-use technology in China’s military modernisation has become a major source of concern for Western security circles. From space exploration and chip manufacturing to shipbuilding and missile production, Beijing in recent years has merged civilian and military technologies across sectors.

The strategy, openly detailed and widely recognised as Military-Civil Fusion (MCF), is designed to advance dual-use innovations that simultaneously strengthen defence capabilities and fuel economic growth.

China is neither the first nor the only nation to pursue such a strategy. Similar approaches have long been used by Western powers, including the US, UK, and France. What distinguishes Beijing, however, is the scale of its programmes and the advanced technologies that have pushed it to the forefront of global defence modernisation.

Importantly, the MCF programme in China is no clandestine endeavour. It is a publicly stated national policy supported by the highest authorities. Its central idea is to organise civilian infrastructure, businesses, and technological advancements so that they can be diverted to military applications during emergencies.

In practice, this blurs the once-clear lines between commerce and defence. A shipyard that builds merchant ships may also construct warships to military standards. An AI lab may just as easily translate its inventions into targeting technologies as into vision systems for commercial use. A semiconductor foundry producing chips for smartphones may also supply the microelectronics used in missiles and radar systems.

Nowhere is this dual-use logic more evident than in the maritime industry. China’s growing naval power and commercial ambitions make it strategically imperative to project and sustain military force across oceans. While new aircraft carriers and destroyers often dominate headlines, the quieter buildup of logistics and transport capacity—frequently overlooked because it lacks the glamour of warships—may ultimately prove decisive.

These vessels may not sound especially high-tech, but China’s integration of civilian ships into military operations represents a distinct form of innovation. Not all dual-use advances depend on cutting-edge technology. The case of China’s roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ships illustrates how ordinary merchant vessels can be transformed into powerful military force multipliers in preparation for future wars.

Roll-On, Roll-Off: China’s Floating Force Multiplier

China’s military has been rapidly modernising, with its main goal being reunification with Taiwan. This has led to an upsurge in military exercises and live-fire drills across the Strait, particularly after former US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit in August 2022.

In China’s war-preparation planning, Ro-Ro ships serve as a clear example of dual-use innovation, enabling commercial fleets to double as strategic military assets. These ships are primarily built for civilian purposes, transporting heavy equipment, vehicles, and trucks across seas for domestic and international trade.
However, within the MCF framework, they can also serve as latent military assets. In times of crisis, a ship that once transported cars to overseas markets could be diverted to move military equipment through disputed waters.

The employment of such vessels would pose little administrative challenge for Beijing. In 2016, the Chinese government passed legislation obligating domestic shipping companies to provide support to the armed forces whenever national interests are deemed at risk. This legal framework effectively erases the distinction between commercial and military fleets, ensuring that Ro-Ro ships—even while engaged in international trade—can be requisitioned without hesitation for defence purposes.

Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been modifying these commercial Ro-Ro ferries to military standards, already equipping them with stern ramps designed to handle amphibious combat vehicles. Such upgrades transform ostensibly commercial vessels into platforms capable of supporting amphibious landings—a capability regarded as strategically essential in any Taiwan Strait contingency.

China has also been quietly stepping up production of Ro-Ro ferries. A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) China Power Project suggests that this expanding output reflects a dual-purpose strategy, with the vessels potentially deployed in a Taiwan conflict.

“While ro-ros are generally innocuous, Chinese military planners have taken note of their dual-use capabilities and are making use of the ships to enhance the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),” the CSIS report noted.
Globally, there are more than 700 Ro-Ro ships in operation, yet China controls fewer than 100. Even so, CSIS analysts highlight a sharp increase ahead. Chinese shipyards are expected to produce as many as 200 new Ro-Ro vessels between 2023 and 2026.

Yet, pinning down exact figures is no easy task. China’s intentionally opaque dual-use shipbuilding system makes it difficult for outsiders to determine how orders, technology transfers, or partnerships feed into Beijing’s military buildup.

China’s use of roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ships for defence purposes first drew attention in 2019, when the 15,000-ton ferry Bang Chui Dao took part in an amphibious assault exercise. Since then, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has steadily woven Ro-Ro vessels into its training. In July 2020, civilian ferries were used to launch amphibious craft directly onto beaches, bypassing port facilities, in both day and night exercises off the coast of Guangdong.

A year later, in August 2021, the PLA expanded the concept further by employing a 10,000-ton-class civilian ferry in landing drills for the first time. The strategy became even more visible in August 2022, after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan heightened tensions. By 2023, their presence in military drills had become routine, with Ro-Ro ferries regularly featured in cross-strait transport exercises, including those held in July and September.

Moreover, the PLA Navy has incorporated civilian ferries into exercises, deploying them to carry amphibious units and release landing craft during mock beach invasions. Military planners have also tested refitting ordinary commercial ships to function as temporary helicopter carriers—a tactic crucial for expanding operational options in a major conflict.

The Military Edge: Dual-Use Innovation

Pentagon-affiliated analysts have repeatedly sounded the alarm about the risks associated with China’s expanding dual-use maritime capabilities—and not without reason. Today, Beijing commands the world’s largest navy by sheer numbers, surpassing even the United States in hull count. According to US Department of Defense assessments, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) maintains roughly 355 frontline vessels, organised into three major fleets along China’s vast coastline.

By comparison, the US Navy operates about 305 frontline ships, with resources split roughly 60–40 between the Pacific and Atlantic theatres. Projections suggest that by 2030 the PLAN could add another 70 warships, while the US Navy—limited by budgets, industrial constraints, and political debates—may add only 42.

Even though the PLAN enjoys numerical superiority on paper, the contribution of China’s civilian shipping sector could prove just as critical in a potential Taiwan campaign. Chinese military planning documents outline a phased approach to a cross-strait offensive. First, a joint firepower campaign—marked by concentrated missile strikes—would degrade Taiwan’s air defences, command centres, and coastal fortifications. Only after this preparatory barrage would amphibious landings begin.

Here lies one of Beijing’s most pressing vulnerabilities. Despite commanding the world’s largest fleet by vessel numbers, the PLAN lacks the specialised amphibious lift capacity required for a full-scale cross-strait invasion. Currently, it fields around nine amphibious assault ships, 30 landing ship tanks (LSTs), 20 landing ship mediums (LSMs), and several dozen smaller landing craft. Over the past decade, modernisation has centred on inducting Yuzhao-class LPDs and Yushen-class LHAs. The navy has also introduced new landing craft designed to operate with these large platforms, alongside a limited number of new LSTs and LSMs replacing ageing vessels.

Even with years of sustained modernisation, the PLA lacks the lift and logistics capacity to mount a large-scale invasion of Taiwan. Analysts broadly agree that Beijing would need to land at least 300,000 troops to establish and hold a beachhead, yet its amphibious assets could deliver only a fraction of that. Reports suggest the PLAN’s fleet could transport just one division—around 20,000 troops—in a single lift. Unless China significantly accelerates amphibious ship production, it will likely remain years away from acquiring the capacity required for such an operation.

The challenge does not end with landing troops. Sustaining a beachhead demands a continuous flow of reinforcements, equipment, and supplies under heavy resistance. On this front, the PLAN’s auxiliary fleet is severely limited. Even across the relatively short 106-kilometre Taiwan Strait, its support capacity would be stretched to the breaking point.

To compensate, China has increasingly turned to its civilian maritime sector, mobilising hundreds of commercial vessels for missions ranging from over-the-shore logistics and at-sea replenishment to casualty evacuation, medical support, and combat search and rescue.

Ro-Ro ships, equipped with stern ramps capable of loading and unloading vehicles directly onto docks or beaches, provide a flexible means of mass transport. Each vessel can reportedly carry around 300 vehicles and 1,500 personnel, making them an indispensable supplement to China’s limited amphibious military assets.

Acknowledging this strategic utility, the PLA in 2012 established “strategic projection support ship fleets” within major shipyards, effectively weaving commercial shipbuilders into the fabric of China’s military logistics network.

Recently, a fleet of large civilian cargo ships attracted media attention as it transited the Taiwan Strait, moving south from the Bohai Sea off northern China. The unusual voyage sparked speculation that the movement was linked to a potential joint amphibious landing exercise involving the PLA. The fleet consisted of seven Ro-Ro vessels operated by the Yantai-based Bohai Ferry Company in Shandong province. According to Maritime Optima, a real-time ship-tracking platform, the ships deviated from their normal commercial routes in the Bohai Sea—an anomaly that drew scrutiny from maritime analysts and regional security experts.

Such a deviation from standard shipping lanes is rare and suggests coordination beyond routine commercial activity. It also raised questions about whether the vessels were rehearsing logistics for military applications, such as the rapid transport of vehicles, equipment, and personnel. While there is no public confirmation that this fleet was engaged in an active military drill, the manoeuvre reflects Beijing’s focus on integrating civilian maritime assets into broader strategic and operational planning.

In previous cases, similar vessels have been incorporated into PLA exercises to simulate amphibious operations, highlighting their dual-use potential. In May 2018, Chinese state media reported that a 10,000-metric-ton Ro-Ro vessel had been used by the PLA Air Force to transport officers, troops, and equipment over a distance of more than a thousand nautical miles along China’s coastline. The report noted that the ship’s owning company had worked closely with the PLA.

Such exercises, even if only preparatory, allow the PLA to test coordination, timing, and operational readiness for amphibious scenarios, including potential cross-strait contingencies.

In addition to the Ro-Ro fleet, new satellite imagery revealed earlier this year one of China’s latest “invasion barges.” These vessels feature temporary piers that can be linked to other ships via a series of barges, supported by jack-up systems for added stability. Analysts widely interpret the development of these barges as part of Beijing’s preparations for a Taiwan contingency. Their emergence underscores the increasing incorporation of ostensibly civilian or non-military maritime assets into amphibious operations, further blurring the line between commercial infrastructure and military capability.

Moreover, the tracking of these vessels appears inconsistent or deliberately obscured, suggesting either that China intends to limit public monitoring or that the ships may in fact be operated directly by the PLAN. In the past, dual-purpose ferries participating in military exercises alongside the PLA have frequently disabled their Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), preventing real-time tracking by commercial maritime platforms.

This supplementary capacity strengthens China’s ability to support a potential invasion of Taiwan, but its utility extends well beyond that scenario. A hybrid force combining military and civilian amphibious assets offers flexibility, enabling rapid deployment in future operations across the Indo-Pacific. It also provides critical capabilities for disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and emergency logistics. In this way, China can project power while maintaining adaptability for non-combat contingencies.

The strategic importance of civilian vessels in expanding China’s amphibious capabilities is further highlighted in the Pentagon’s most recent annual report on Chinese military developments, released in December. The report states:

“Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that analysts believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities, such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets to address this gap. The PLA may have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.”

The strategic utility of temporary piers in this context has drawn significant attention. When used alongside Ro-Ros and jack-up barges, these piers enable the rapid transfer of vehicles and equipment from ship to shore, extending the operational reach of China’s amphibious forces. Their integration is likely a deliberate attempt to leverage dual-use maritime infrastructure to strengthen both the PLA’s amphibious and logistical capabilities, while also providing flexible solutions for non-combat missions.

Yet civilian ships are not without limitations. In a combat scenario, these vessels would be slow-moving, highly vulnerable, and in need of protection against aircraft and warships armed with anti-ship missiles. Technical constraints add to these vulnerabilities. Vehicle lanes on commercial Ro-Ros may be too narrow for many tracked armoured vehicles, while internal features such as elevators restrict the types of vehicles that can be stowed on each deck.

One particular challenge lies in ramp design. Standard Ro-Ros have freight decks elevated well above the waterline to align with port quay walls. This makes them unsuitable for launching amphibious craft directly into the water. To overcome this, the PLA has retrofitted some Ro-Ros with specialised ramps designed for in-water operations, enabling amphibious combat vehicles to be launched and recovered more effectively.

In collaboration with shipbuilders, the military has also added modifications tailored to operational needs. These include helipads, medical facilities, upgraded command and communications systems, improved freight deck ventilation, and other enhancements designed to optimise dual-use performance.