State Identities in South Asia: A Contested Road

South Asia is one of the most diverse regions in terms of religion, ethnicity, language and cultural practices. It includes believers of all Semitic and oriental religions. The history of state formation in South Asia is an interesting interplay of religion and politics. All states, except India and Nepal, have their own declared state religions. While in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Maldives, Islam is the state religion; Sri Lanka and Bhutan have declared Buddhism as their state religion. India, and lately Nepal, are declared secular states and have made provision for equal treatment of all religions in their constitutions.

Asian religions like Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism originated in South Asia. The core of Hinduism is a Brahmanical world view, around which many other layers of beliefs – from nature worship to animistic practices – are arranged in concentric circles. Both Jainism and Buddhism developed as critiques of the hierarchical structure and practices of Brahmanical Hinduism. They mounted a serious challenge to Brahmanical Hinduism but failed to eclipse its hegemony completely as it underwent a transformation under the leadership of Adi-Shankaracharya.

Semitic religions arrived in South Asia very early due to the vibrant trade relations between South Asia and West Asia. Christianity reached South Asia as far back as the first century AD. It is believed that St Thomas, one of the twelve disciples of Jesus Christ, came to the coast of Kerala and preached Christianity. Before the European colonial powers established their predominance on the western coast of India, Christianity had already emerged as a major religion there.

Islam arrived in South Asia in the 7th century. It was brought to the Malabar Coast as part of the trade and cultural interactions with the Arabs. The first mosque in South Asia (Cheraman Mosque) was constructed at Kodungallur on the Malabar Coast of Kerala in AD 629, when Prophet Muhammad was alive. Later, Islam spread to northern India as part of the interactions between Persia, Central Asia and South Asia. Islam had a tremendous influence on South Asian society. Similarly, Islam assimilated many local traditions, including the caste system prevalent in South Asian societies.

Religion and religious interpretations functioned as ideological cover and justification for kingdoms and empires. In the ‘Ancient’ period, Brahmanical Hinduism and Buddhism provided the necessary legitimacy for various power centres in the vast landmass of South Asia. The Gupta, Chalukya and Chola empires used Brahmanical Hinduism as a legitimising ideology for their respective empires. The Mauryas, especially Ashoka, the Kushan Empire and King Harshavardhana used Buddhism for the same purpose.

In the ‘Medieval’ period, Islam spread over to the Indo-Gangetic plains and established itself as the religion of the ruling elite. The Sultanate period witnessed many a tussle between the orthodox version of Islam and its more popular Sufi traditions. Many a time, the rulers took sides in this tussle according to the context and compulsions of political power.

Under Mughal rule, Islam gained prominence since the ruling elite belonged to it. At the same time, the peculiar context in which the Mughal Empire was located – majority Hindus ruled by a minority Muslim political elite – necessitated a kind of judicious balancing of both Hinduism and Islam. The lavish patronage of Hindu and Muslim religious elites and places of worship by the Mughal rulers was an example of this.

Considering the diversity of his subjects and the plurality of faiths among them, Emperor Akbar (1543–1605) tried to evolve a new creed called Din-i-Ilahi (Divine Faith), in which he wanted to combine all the virtues of existing religions. This effort by Emperor Akbar to create a new state-sponsored religion, devoid of dogma, encountered serious criticism from the traditional Ulema. Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1664) was at the forefront in opposing the syncretistic ideas of Emperor Akbar and his successor Jehangir. Shaikh Sirhindi accused Din-i-Ilahi of being an articulation of pantheism and a clear deviation from the monotheistic principle of Islam.

The tension between traditional Islam and the demand for a syncretistic tradition continued during the later Mughal period and was finally settled in favour of traditional orthodox Sunni Islam under the regime of Aurangzeb (1618–1707), the last of the great Mughals. Islam played an important role in the ideological state apparatus of the Mughal Empire.

In the Deccan region of South India, the Bahmani and Vijayanagar kingdoms also used religion in their statecraft. The Vijayanagar kingdom was created for the protection and uplift of the Hindu religion, and the Bahmani kingdom was ruled by Muslim rulers who strived for the spread of Islam. There were occasional wars between these neighbouring kingdoms, one of the reasons for which was their differing religious standpoints. Similarly, Islam played a major role in the establishment and day-to-day functioning of the Mysore State under Haider Ali and his son Tipu Sultan.

Till the colonial period, the diverse religious traditions coexisted on the South Asian landmass in a more or less peaceful manner. Empires and state formations that emerged and disappeared in South Asia in the pre-colonial period largely kept themselves away from intervening in the religio-cultural life of the people. This status quo underwent a radical change under colonialism. The Portuguese colonialists came to South Asia in the last decade of the 15th century with strong notions of the superiority of Western Christianity (Catholicism) and treated the people of South Asia as subordinates.

This attitude provoked all sections of people against them. The Portuguese attempts to completely change the liturgy, theological notions, cultural practices and administrative structure of the Syrian Christians in India through the Synod of Diamper in AD 1599 led to their resistance and the emergence of the Koonan Kurishu Satyam (Oath of the Leaning Cross) in 1653 at Kochi. This can be considered as one of the initial protests against the colonial powers.

Similarly, the Portuguese provoked the Muslims of South Asia too. The battles between the Portuguese and the Zamorin, the Hindu Raja of Calicut, supported by the Muslims, prompted Shaikh Zainuddin Makhdum of Ponnani to exhort Muslims colonialists. It was one of the early examples of remarkable Hindu-Muslim unity against invading outsiders.

The religious pluralism of South Asian societies was not reflected in the politico-administrative structures to any great extent. This phenomenon was unintelligible to the various colonial powers that came to South Asia. The mercantile capitalist phase of colonialism in South Asia, up to the consolidation of British authority, was not very effective in destabilising this religious equilibrium. The limited interests of the early colonialists never demanded a serious intervention in the politico-cultural life of the people. But whenever they attempted to do so, it resulted in stiff resistance.

This scenario, however, changed under British colonialism. Unlike other colonial powers, the British wanted to establish their political power in South Asia. For this, they used all means at their disposal – from brute force to the construction of ideological cover – to legitimise their presence and hegemony over the politico-administrative structures in various parts of South Asia. Communalism, based on segregating religious communities as exclusive entities, became their major tool in dividing the unity of the people. The invention of communalism played a major role in creating the gulf between Hindus and Muslims in South Asia.

The First War of Independence in 1857, waged between the nascent British power and the united force of Muslim and Hindu feudal elites, was an eye-opener to the British. They realised that Hindu-Muslim unity of any sort was not in favour of the perpetuation of British rule. The strategy to divide the population on communal lines was the direct outcome of the experience of 1857.

British colonialism used the discipline of history and the conduct of census to develop a communal ideology. The classification of the history of the Indian subcontinent in religious terms – i.e. the Ancient (Hindu) period, the Medieval (Muslim) period, and the Modern (British/Christian) period – and the writing of textbooks based on this classification created divisions along communal lines. The juxtaposition of the ‘glorious period’ of ancient/Hindu India and the period of ‘subjugation’ under the medieval/Muslim rule created the expected effect. The implied logic in this historical narrative was that the British provided the balance between the distinct warring categories of Hindus and Muslims. This was projected as a justification for their claim to rule the Indian subcontinent.

The rise of the National Movement in India, since the launching of the Indian National Congress in 1885, was an attempt by the Indian elites to confront the colonial authorities. The radicalisation of the National Movement under Bal Gangadhar Tilak and others became a major challenge to the colonial authorities. The overt display and use of Hindu symbols as part of the National Movement alienated the Muslims from it. The formation of the All India Muslim League in 1906 was, in a way, a reaction to the pro-Hindu tilt of the National Movement under the militant Hindu nationalists. The colonial authorities, within no time, used the suspicion between the Muslims and Hindus to divide the National Movement. The prejudices and suspicion between the Hindus and Muslims led to the formulation of the idea of ‘Muslim nationalism’ in South Asia and the demand for the creation of Pakistan – the homeland of the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent – and finally resulted in the Partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947. Since then, the conflict between two religious communities in the pre-independence period has transformed into a conflict between two post-colonial nation states.

The formation of Pakistan is largely the outcome of the intertwining of religion and politics in a specific historic context. The only other example is the formation of Israel, though in the same historic juncture. Pakistan was created as a state for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Its founding fathers did not conceive Pakistan as an Islamic state. Though Jinnah used religion to mobilise the Muslims and fight for a separate state for them, his vision was that of a secular state. But the tussle between secular leaders and those who wanted an Islamic state was reflected in constitution-making in the early stages. After the formation of Pakistan, the founding fathers realised that the only unifying factor in the otherwise diverse and plural Pakistan was Islam, and Islam alone. The sole dependence of the ruling elite of Pakistan on Islam became evident in the Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 12 March 1949. The Objectives Resolution made Islam the cornerstone of statecraft and polity in Pakistan.

The assumption that Islam would ensure the unity of a diverse country like Pakistan crumbled when the country was dismembered into Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971. The formation of Bangladesh underlined the fact that religion cannot be the basis of nation-building. Instead of making this realisation a foundation for nation-building in the modern world, the ruling elite of Pakistan moved further towards Islam, which later led to the Islamisation of the state and polity of Pakistan under both democratic and military regimes.

Some leaders like Gen. Ayub Khan were dismissive of religion. But the cause of fundamentalist Islam has been championed frequently in Pakistan. Even the democratic parties championed it. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto succumbed to Islamic forces and gave in easily. It was during his period that subcontinental Islam started being replaced by an Arabised Islam. In the aftermath of the 1971 war, the ruling elites shunned deeper introspection into the real reasons for the creation of Bangladesh in favour of rewriting history. Pakistan rediscovered its religious, cultural and geographical proclivity towards West Asia.

Without a popular mandate and the compulsion to legitimise his rule, Gen. Zia ul Haq went about Islamising the Pakistani state and society in the 1980s. He espoused orthodox Islam and proposed an extensive restructuring of the country’s key institutions and political processes in accordance with Islamic values. The Islam he championed was more the legalistic and orthodox version of Islam. The legal strictures against women, the evidentiary laws in cases of violence and rape, insistence on the wearing of the veil, and withdrawal from public life were far removed from the traditional Islamic practices of the subcontinent. He promoted a new brand of Ulema, the radical, militant kind. Until his advent to power in 1977, the Ulema still had a large number of genuinely pious, well-read, and highly respected religious scholars. He had them marginalised and replaced by the leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat-ul-Ulema Pakistan.

He used the Ulema and the religious parties in support of the US objectives in Afghanistan and prepared the ground for using them later against India in Kashmir and elsewhere. The perceived defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan further gave this burgeoning Islamic fervour a boost. Gen. Zia’s Islamisation did not only have an impact on the state but did great damage to society. Islamisation under Gen. Zia was the material expression of state ideology and a legitimisation project. But now, the state is no longer the only patron of Islamic ideology, nor is the Ulema, with the development of a plurality of non-state associations like private educational institutions in the country. Gen. Zia’s Islamisation did little to promote national unity. On the contrary, it rendered Islam into a divisive force, pitting secular against religious forces, Sunni and Shia, Muslim and non-Muslims. It is difficult to undo some of these social processes set in motion. Some of these have developed vested interests in the perpetuation of the old order. The democratic regimes did not even bother to challenge them outright. Rather, they also championed the cause of fundamentalist Islam at times. The reason has been to undermine the opposition by making expedient alliances with Islamic groups to prolong their power.

The religious right and the Jihadis have become the biggest challengers to the state in Pakistan today. The religious right does not have much electoral support, but its influence and reach over the state apparatus is enormous. Gen. Pervez Musharraf was perceived to be liberal when he took over power, but his image took a beating within months when he reversed his decision to amend the procedure for registration of cases under the blasphemy law. Gen. Musharraf also did not exercise much autonomy from the religious forces. As Gen. Musharraf was not dependent on these Islamic groups for legitimacy and authority, he tried to challenge them but found himself severely constrained. In Pakistan’s political culture, Islam will continue to be used in manifold ways for political ends. The Pakistani military establishment, till today, continues to use the religious groups for their strategic objectives.

The rise of the Taliban since 1994 in Afghanistan, and subsequently their increasing spread within Pakistan, is a grave cause for concern. Their establishment of an Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan from 1996 till the end of 2001 was the manifestation of the kind of Islamic state they had to offer. Their ideology, based on the Islamisation of society at the grassroots level, is derived from the fundamentalist movement inspired by Shah Wallihullah and the Deoband School. The movement is puritanical and reformist, opposing all unorthodox practices. The enforcement of the Sharia is the main point of the Taliban’s political agenda. It aims at building a theocratic state in which the Ulema will have the power to designate and control the government. It views competitive electoral politics as a source of fitna (division) within the Ummah (Muslim community). The Taliban’s interpretation of the Sharia is extremely conservative. It condemns any attempts at itjihad (interpretation). They espouse a violent and intolerant interpretation of Islam. Their anomalous interpretation of Islam has emerged from an extreme and perverse interpretation of Deobandism. They now gravely threaten Pakistan’s own stability. Unless the creeping Talibanisation in the NWFP and tribal regions is arrested soon, Pakistan may pay a heavy price. The Taliban cannot be fought with force alone. To undermine the growing influence of the Taliban, Pakistan needs to undergo an ideological battle. Pakistan’s indigenous and rich tradition of Islamic spiritualism, popularised by great Sufi saints, needs to be popularised again.

The interplay of religion and politics has led to adverse consequences for the other states of South Asia as well. In India, Partition left a bitter legacy of a communal divide between Hindus and Muslims. The rise of Hindu nationalist movements, led by organisations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Jana Sangh, brought religious identity into greater political pprominence from the late 1960s onwards. The Jana Sangh, which later became the Bharatiya Janata Party, developed around the ideology of Hindutva, which emphasises Hindu cultural and religious identity as central to Indian nationhood. This ideology envisions India as a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu state) and advocates for what it terms the cultural integration of all communities, including Muslims, into what it considers mainstream Indian traditions. During the 1980s, Hindu nationalist movements gained momentum. Their mobilisation centred around the Babri Masjid, an old mosque that Hindu groups claimed was built on the birthplace of Lord Ram, an important deity in Hinduism. The competing claims over this site became a major point of contention. In December 1992, activists from the RSS, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and Bajrang Dal brought down the Babri Masjid structure. This event triggered significant communal tensions and riots across various parts of India. These movements, through their interpretation of Hindutva, have established a notable political presence and continue to advocate for their vision of Indian nationalism rooted in Hindu cultural identity. This political development has created concerns within the Muslim community regarding their place and security in Indian society, leading to feelings of uncertainty about their status and belonging in the country.

The growth of these movements reflects broader questions about national identity, religious accommodation, and the balance between majority and minority interests in India’s diverse democracy.

The Sikhs, the other major religious group in India, also passed through a troubled phase. In pursuit of political power, some Sikh political parties appealed to Sikh religious sentiments. A moderate movement for greater autonomy changed course to demand a separate state called Khalistan – a Sikh theocratic state, a vision of a state based on Sikh nationhood. The movement acquired a militant stance and launched a violent campaign for an independent state. The violence that followed was brutal and indiscriminate. Highly communal and selective mass killings were carried out to create a communal divide in the well-integrated Hindu-Sikh communities. On the one hand, the government dealt with the problem through a political package to address the Sikh demands for autonomy and political power, but on the other hand, the movement was crushed by strong counter-insurgency measures. Though there was an intense period of violence in Indian Punjab, the healing has been relatively swift, and religion is no longer a source of tension between the Sikhs and the Hindus.

Sri Lanka’s devastating ethnic conflict also has strong undercurrents of the interplay between religion and politics. It has historical roots. The colonial administration gave privileged treatment to the minority Sri Lankan Tamils (Hindus), concentrated in northern Sri Lanka, over a period of time. This led to tremendous discontent among the majority Sinhala (Buddhist) population. In the post-colonial phase of Sri Lankan history, during the process of the indigenisation of political power, the majority Sinhalas established firm control over the administration and began discriminating against the Tamils. In order to legitimise the privileged treatment of the Sinhalas, they created a historical narrative in which Sri Lanka is depicted as a Sinhala-Buddhist nation always in conflict with Tamils – the outsiders.

The perpetuation of Sinhala-Buddhist communal ideology by the Sri Lankan state and civil society led to the ethno-religious conflict between the Sri Lankan state and the Tamils. The communal ideology also led to the victimisation of the Sri Lankan Muslims by both the Tamils and the Sinhalas. Religion, thus, has been a major factor in the destabilisation of the polity and social fabric of Sri Lanka.

The modernisation process in Bhutan led to the precipitation of ethno-religious conflict on a massive scale. The conflict between the Bhutanese state, dominated by the Ngalongs (Mahayana Buddhists), and the Lhotshampas (people of Nepali origin who are mainly Hindus) escalated. The state-sponsored ethno-religious conflict led to the expulsion of more than one lakh Lhotshampas from Bhutan.

The situation in Bangladesh is also reflective of the general South Asian pattern of majority-minority conflict. The religious minorities in Bangladesh mainly consist of Hindus and Buddhists. The radicalisation of Islam has created many problems for the Hindus and the Buddhists, who are mainly tribals residing in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. For long, the tribals of Chittagong waged an armed struggle against the Bangladesh state in order to protect their culture and religion.

Islamisation, assertive Hindu nationalism, and now Talibanisation stand in the way of the creation of modern South Asian states in search of peace, progress, and prosperity. The promotion of exclusive religious nationalism has divided the people and states. It has retarded growth and development and inhibited people from achieving their full potential. South Asia’s religious diversity and its pluralist nature of society need to be protected. Religions can coexist harmoniously, as they have done historically. But the politicisation and radicalisation of religion are leading to greater communalisation of society and increasing the divide among religious communities. This has only weakened the state and nation-building process in South Asia. Time has now come to come together, find common ground, and aim for prosperity.