The Churn in the Indian Ocean: India & Middle Powers

Introduction

The question of who will enforce the rules in the oceans remains a contested and complex topic of discussion, especially during intensifying great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Traditionally, global maritime governance has been anchored in international law, namely the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which sets out legal norms for navigation, limits, right and duties of states in various delimitation zones (such as territorial seas, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zones and high sea).

However, the growing major power competition, especially between the United States and China, has challenged this rules-based order. The US promotes freedom of navigation and open sea lanes, while China asserts expansive maritime claims, particularly in the South China Sea, backed by military and infrastructural assertiveness. Amid this, regional institutions in the Indo-Pacific, like ASEAN, IORA, and initiatives like the Quad, seek to uphold cooperative norms and collective maritime governance. But lack the institutional efficiency and enforcement capacity to manage disputes independently. Thus, ocean governance in the Indo-Pacific is currently shaped by a tense interplay of legal norms, power politics, and regional multilateral efforts, with no single actor in uncontested control.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), embedded within the broader Indo-Pacific, has emerged as an interesting zone of geopolitical and normative contestation. It acts as the artery of global commerce and energy flows, and a site of competing strategic interests and normative frameworks.

As great power rivalries intensify in the Indo-Pacific region, namely between the United States and China, India and other middle powers have sought to assert influence through norm-making and norm-shaping mechanisms. However, this endeavour is fraught with historical legacies, structural limitations emerging from financial, bureaucratic and similar issues, institutional inertia, and regional asymmetries in power and interests.

This paper focuses on the scope, limitations, and challenges faced by India and other middle powers in norm-making and shaping in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The IOR is a geographical subset of larger geostrategic Indo-Pacific construct. The IOR historically has remained connected through trade, culture and human intercourse, bringing several similarities in countries sitting across oceans. Norms are one such sameness.

Institutionally, it traces the historical evolution of India’s normative diplomacy from Panchsheel, the Bandung Conference, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to contemporary efforts at regional institution-building. It emphasises that power is integral to norm entrepreneurship and assesses how regional institutions, especially ASEAN, BIMSTEC and IORA, navigate the delicate balance between inclusivity, sovereignty, and great power dynamics. Finally, the paper proposes institutional strategies for making regional norms and architectures “administration-proof”, that is, resilient to political flux and grounded in continuity and governance.

China Redux

India’s normative engagement in the international system predates its current role in the Indo-Pacific.

The Panchsheel Agreement (1954) between India and China articulated five principles of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, equality, and peaceful coexistence. These ideals laid the groundwork for India’s subsequent global diplomacy, emphasising decolonisation, peaceful dispute resolution, and sovereign equality.

The Bandung Conference (1955) reinforced this normative stance, bringing together Afro-Asian states to challenge the bipolar Cold War order. India played a prominent role, advocating for a world order based not on coercive alliances but on cooperation and justice. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), inaugurated in 1961, institutionalized this ethos. While NAM lacked formal enforcement mechanisms, it advanced an alternative vision of global order that privileged dialogue over domination and development over deterrence.

However, these early normative frameworks had limited material backing. Despite their moral appeal, they were often undercut by global power dynamics and India’s limited capabilities. Nonetheless, they created a vocabulary of values such as sovereignty, equality, and faith in multilateralism that India continues to invoke in contemporary Indo-Pacific diplomacy. Some of the continuing regional norms are:

1. Sovereignty and Non-Interference continue to be a foundational norm, especially emphasised by countries in South and Southeast Asia. It underpins mutual respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Rooted in post-colonial experiences and reflected in ASEAN’s diplomatic culture, this norm remains central to regional cooperation.
2. Freedom of Navigation and Overflight -Derived from UNCLOS, this norm ensures that ships and aircraft of all countries can move freely through international waters and airspace, that is beyond 12nm territorial seas from the coastline. It is particularly emphasised by the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia, and contested by China in parts of the South China Sea through freedom of navigation operations or FONOPs.
3. Peaceful Resolution of Disputes is another key norm, the preference for diplomacy and dialogue over the use of force. Regional institutions like ASEAN, IORA, BIMSTEC and even the SCO support mechanisms for negotiation, consensus-building, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
4. Inclusivity and Multilateralism are other regional norms that many Indo-Pacific countries advocate for to build inclusive regional frameworks that avoid bloc politics. This includes promoting ASEAN centrality, involving small and middle powers in regional decision-making, and opposing exclusive security pacts that divide the region.
5. Sustainable Development and Blue Economy reflect the regional aspiration of the Indo-Pacific countries, several of which are coastal, small and island states. A newer but growing norm is the emphasis on sustainable use of ocean resources, marine conservation, and equitable development of coastal communities. This is evident in IORA’s focus areas and India’s SAGAR vision.
6. Rules-Based Order refers to the upholding of international law, especially UNCLOS, WTO rules, and norms around cyber and digital governance. Middle powers like India, Australia, and Japan often use this concept to counter unilateralism and coercion.
7. ASEAN Centrality has come to be a strong norm in the broader Indo-Pacific, particularly among Southeast Asian countries. It refers to the central role of ASEAN in regional architecture. This ensures that ASEAN remains a hub for dialogue and norm-setting, rather than being sidelined by major power rivalries.
8. Connectivity and Regional Integration is another emerging norm that is taking shape in the form of infrastructure development, economic integration, and people-to-people ties are widely accepted, though they come with contestation over standards, debt sustainability, and strategic alignment—especially in the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Power and Norm-Building

Norm-making is not a neutral or purely ethical endeavour; it is intrinsically tied to power. As constructivist international relations scholars have argued, norms are not only shaped by shared values but also by strategic interests and material capabilities. In the Indo-Pacific, the capacity to institutionalise norms, whether through freedom of navigation, rules-based order, or maritime security, depends on power projection, legitimacy, and diplomatic influence.

For India and other middle powers such as Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea, the challenge lies in balancing normative aspirations with strategic realism. These states seek to promote a multipolar Indo-Pacific order based on openness, inclusivity, and multilateralism. However, they must do so in an environment that is increasingly polarised by U.S.-China rivalry, and where norm diffusion is often conflated with power alignment.

India’s emphasis on a “rules-based international order,” “Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative” (IPOI), Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) doctrine and the recent MAHASAGAR vision reflect its desire to craft a regional security and development architecture that upholds shared norms. Yet, norm diffusion without power reinforcement risks rhetorical dilution, especially in a contested neighbourhood marked by China’s assertiveness and institutional fragmentation.

The Role of Institutions: Relevance, Upgradation, and Reform

Since the issue of power has come to be central to norm-making, shaping, and building within regional institutions, different countries based on their status and capabilities view their engagements with multilateralism differently. Major powers often view institutions as instruments to project influence, shape rules to align with their strategic interests, and legitimise their leadership in the region. Middle powers, on the other hand, see institutions as platforms for coalition-building, norm diffusion, and balancing between great powers without direct confrontation. They act as norm entrepreneurs, promoting values such as inclusivity, multilateralism, and regional stability. Small and Islands States (SIDS) primarily value institutions for the normative protection they offer—preserving sovereignty, enabling voice, and mitigating asymmetries of power through consensus-based frameworks. Consequently, while all actors participate in regional institutions, their expectations and approaches vary significantly based on their relative capabilities and strategic needs.

Norm-building in the Indo-Pacific cannot be divorced from regional institutions. However, institutions must evolve to reflect changing power realities and normative priorities. Many existing architectures, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), BIMSTEC, or the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), amongst others, suffer from limited mandates, bureaucratic inertia, and under-resourcing.

To remain relevant, these institutions must be able to adapt in three ways. Firstly, align themselves with current geopolitical realities (e.g., climate change, maritime security, digital connectivity). Second, upgrade their governance mechanisms to enable quicker decision-making. And third, diversify membership and enhance functional specialization to remain effective. The Indian Ocean Region has seen some success in this direction, especially with ASEAN’s centrality in broader Indo-Pacific dialogues. Institutions like the East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), while not Indian Ocean-specific, have played critical roles in embedding norms of dialogue, peaceful dispute settlement, and consensus-building.

However, ASEAN’s strength, consensus and inclusivity are also its limitations. Its non-confrontational approach and the principle of non-interference often result in a lowest-common-denominator outcome, which impedes collective responses to pressing issues like South China Sea militarization or cyber threats.

ASEAN and Normative Regional Architecture: Strengths and Complications
Noted scholars have rightly argued emphasis on ASEAN as an indispensable actor in regional norm-making is well-founded. ASEAN’s ability to convene and its normative influence, through mechanisms like the ASEAN Way, have shaped regional expectations about diplomacy, sovereignty, and inclusivity.

ASEAN has successfully created a platform for middle powers and great powers to engage without coercion, preserving regional autonomy. Its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) has become a reference point for regional engagement, embedding principles such as non-aggression and peaceful dispute resolution.
However, ASEAN also faces complications such as its internal divisions and varying strategic alignments dilute consensus; Its institutional weakness makes norm enforcement difficult. Furthermore, it influences is limited within the sub-region of Southeast Asia.

Thus, while ASEAN’s normative value is significant, it cannot alone uphold a coherent regional architecture. Middle powers and like-minded states must support ASEAN-led mechanisms while also creating mini-lateral groupings such as the Quad, which can operationalise norms in more focused domains (e.g., maritime security, critical infrastructure, digital governance).

Institutional Resilience: Making Norms’ Administrative Proof’

One of the major challenges in sustaining regional norm-making is political volatility and administrative discontinuity. Governments change, priorities shift, and alliances evolve. Hence, regional institutions must be designed to be “administratively independent”, referring to being insulated from the whims of political cycles.

Therefore, the regional institutions can be made resilient in the following ways: Firstly, by embedding norms into treaties and charters, rather than relying on informal consensus. Secondly, creating technical and bureaucratic sub-committees that maintain operational continuity. Third, ensuring civil society and private sector participation, which can act as stabilising forces. Fourth, developing mechanisms for creating institutional memory and carrying out and implementing policy-relevant work.

By institutionalising norms in administrative frameworks, states can ensure that regional governance does not unravel with leadership changes. This is particularly important in issue areas such as maritime safety, disaster response, and trade facilitation, where long-term coordination is critical.

India’s Multilateral Approach: Scope and Constraints

India’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific is shaped by its identity as a civilizational state, a developing economy, and an aspiring global power. It is on the leadership to decide whether it wants to play its role in upholding norms as a norm maker, shaper or upholder for championing values of sovereignty, non-interference, inclusivity, and development-led security.

Having said that, India faces multiple constraints. While India is a rising economic power, it still faces resource limitations constrain its ability to fund large-scale regional initiatives or offer public goods at the scale China does. It’s a contested neighbourhood, including tensions with Pakistan and China, that distracts from broader Indo-Pacific outreach. India’s slow bureaucratic processes and absence of a centralized Indo-Pacific strategy dilute its normative clarity.

To address these, India must prioritise regional issues in its multilateral engagements, such as energy security, climate change, digital standards, and supply chain resilience. Presently, New Delhi seeks partnership with like-minded middle powers (e.g., Japan, Australia, France, Indonesia) to create issue-based coalitions. Similarly, it is enhancing its diplomatic and institutional capacity by training regional specialists and investing in multilateral institutions. India’s IPOI and SAGAR initiatives offer potential platforms for such engagement, but they need clearer mandates, resource allocation, and partner buy-in.

Supply Chains and Normative Geoeconomics

Building resilient supply chains that can withstand crises and disasters is another important area of concern. The COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical disruptions (such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and U.S.-China tech wars) have foregrounded the importance of norm-based supply chains. The economic dimension of norm-building is becoming critical, especially as countries seek to de-risk their economies without reverting to protectionism. Instead of seeking purely commercial aspects of supply chains, they must remain tethered to human-centric needs, values, and aspirations.

India has an opportunity to position itself as a champion of transparent, resilient, and fair supply chains, particularly in sectors like pharmaceuticals, rare earths, and digital services. Initiatives like the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) with Japan and Australia underscore this pivot.

However, navigating widening norm-based issues, from data localisation to labour standards, requires India to harmonise domestic policy with global standards and enhance regulatory coherence. This remains a work in progress.

The Way Ahead for India

Today, the Indian Ocean is increasingly subject to geopolitical contestation, rivalries between the U.S. and China, China’s expanding maritime presence, and emerging minilateral frameworks such as the Quad. In this context, regional institutions serve a stabilising normative function. They promote inclusive multilateralism in contrast to exclusive strategic blocs. Norms emphasise developmental issues, such as climate adaptation and blue economy, which resonate with the Global South. Further norms uphold norms of sovereignty and non-interference, helping smaller states maintain agency.

For India, these institutions offer a platform to exercise normative leadership. Through SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), MAHASAGAR, the Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative, and its active role in IORA and BIMSTEC, India seeks to foster a cooperative maritime order grounded in mutual respect, economic development, and shared security. However, to succeed, India and its partners must invest in institutional capacity, norm internalisation, and people-to-people exchanges.

Maritime security dialogues, cultural diplomacy, academic exchanges, and blue economy collaborations are crucial to translating normative ideals into practical outcomes. As regional institutions like IORA, BIMSTEC, and ASEAN grow in relevance, they must draw upon this history to shape a resilient and inclusive future. Through shared norms, these organisations can ensure that the Indian Ocean remains not a zone of zero-sum competition, but a common space of cooperation, opportunity, and mutual growth.